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RECENT DECISIONS
CoNPLICT OF LA.w~EsCHEAT OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY To THE STATE oF

SITUs-The intestate died domiciled in California leaving no known heirs or
next of kin. In addition to property in California adequate to pay his debts, the
deceased left deposits in three New York banks. The domiciliary administrator,
acting as ancillary administrator in New York, received the proceeds of the
bank accounts, petitioned for judicial settlement, and requested payment of the
ancillary estate to himself as domiciliary administrator. Held, the money should
be paid to the Comptroller of the State of New York as abandoned property.
In re Menschefrend's Estate, 283 App. Div. 463, 128 N.Y.S. (2d) 738 (1954).
Courts are in general agreement that personalty, wherever situated, will be
distributed according to the law of the decedent's domicile.1 But where a
decedent has no heirs or next of kin, there is considerable confusion not only as
to whether the property should escheat to the state of its situs or to the state of
the decedent's domicile, but also as to where the situs is when the property is
intangible.2 The English courts contend that the law of the situs of the property, which for intangibles is the domicile of the debtor, should look to the
domicile of the decedent-creditor to determine the character of the taking by
that state under its escheat laws.3 If decedent's domicile takes as heir and
successor, the maxim nwhilia sequuntur personanz applies, and the property goes
to the domiciliary administrator;4 but if the state of domicile takes under the
right of the sovereign to bona vacantia, the forum of situs recognizes no other
law than its own and claims the property.5 By failing to look to the character of
the California escheat laws, the court in the principal case misinterpreted the
English rule6 but reached the same result an English court would have reached.7
It may be that this failure to examine the law of the decedent's domicile is a
tacit recognition of the uselessness of so doing in the face of the unanimity with
which American courts hold that escheat is not a matter of succession by a state

115 C.J.S., Conffict of Laws 926-928 (1939); 11 hr.. ]UR., Conffict of Laws §83
(1937); 2 WHARTON, CoNFLICTS 011 LAw, 3d ed., p. 1283 (1905). For a codification of
this rule see Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937) §946.
2 In some countries the conffict of laws rule is that the situs of the property looks
to the citizenship of the decedent for the applicable law, 47 hr.. J. lN.r. L. 720 (1953).
3 This rule, although clearly enough set out in In re Barnett's Trusts, [1902] 1 Ch. 847,
is sometimes confused with the English internal law rule which holds that the state takes
by the sovereign's right to bona 11acantia. See principal case, 128 N.Y.S. (2d) 738 at 746
(1954).
4 In re Maldonado, [1953] 2 All E.R. 300. Spain, Italy, Switzerland and Germany
have similar rules, taking property under their escheat laws as final heir and successor.
5 In re Barnett's Trust, note 3 supra; In the Estate of Musurus, [1936] 2 All E.R.
1666; In the Goods of Beggia, 1 Add. 340, 162 Eng. Rep. 119 (1822). Personalty in
England, Austria and Turkey escheats by virtue of a sovereign's right to bona 11acantia.
6 See note 3 supra.
7 California takes escheated property by virtue of its right to bona 11acantia. In re
Miner's Estate, 143 Cal. 194, 76 P. 968 (1904).
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to the property of its domiciliary, but of the sovereign's right to bona 11acantia.8
It is more likely that the court held that the public policy of New York, as
indicated by its Abandoned Property Law, 9 is strong enough to overcome the
rule of comity usually applied by the law of the situs, that of looking to the
law of decedent's domicile to secure uniformity in administration of the estate.10
While English and American courts agree that the situs should not apply the
maxim mobilia sequuntur personam when it would conflict with public policy
of the forum, 11 the English courts have held that statutes declaring forum
policy no less forcefully than that of New York are still not strong enough to
preclude application of the maxim.12 Prior to the principal case, however, two
American courts rejected the English conflicts of law rule in holding that, absent
a specific statute, the situs of intangible property for the purposes of escheat is
at the domicile of the decedent.13 Whether this result is constitutionally required has been in some dispute,14 but the growing tendency, especially when
the state of the obligor's domicile claims an interest in the property,15 is to disregard the fiction of mobilia sequuntur personam in favor of a rationale determining situs by a test of sheer power and control over the res, or in the case of
an intangible, over the obligor. 16 It is somewhat unclear, however, whether the
court in the principal case is reading out the old maxim by applying this test of
power and control over the obligor, or whether it is merely deciding that New
York public policy is stronger than the rule of comity which finds the situs of
an intangible at the domicile of the decedent. Whatever the rationale, the result
is consistent with the current trend of authority. It thus recognizes that the
8 19 AM. Jan., Escheat 381 (1939); 30 C.J.S., Escheat §1 (1939); 117 A.L.R. 948
(1938). For the opposite argument, that the state takes as heir, see the dissenting opinions
in In re Miner's Estate, note 7 supra, and Wilder v. Charleston Transit Co., 120 W.Va.
319, 197 S.E. 814 (1938).
9 2½ N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §600(h).
10 In re Barton's Estate, 196 Cal. 508, 238 P. 681 (1925); Goodrich, "!nheritance
Problems in the Conflict of Laws," 24 MicH. L. REv. 558 at 561 (1926).
11 In re Maldonado, note 4 supra, at 306; 2 BBALB, CoNFLICT OF LAws 1029 (1935).
Some states have abrogated the common law maxim by statute, 1 Miss. Code Ann. (1942)
§467. See also Griswold, ''Renvoi Revisited," 51 HARv. L. REv. 1165 at 1195 (1938).
12 In re Maldonado, note 4 supra, held that the English Administration of Estates
Act, §46(1)(vi) (1925), was not a strong enough statement of policy to override the
common law conflicts rule.
13 In re Lyons' Estate, 175 Wash. 115, 26 P. (2d) 615 (1933); In re Rapoport's
Estate, 317 Mich. 291, 26 N.W. (2d) 777 (1947).
14 The Washington court in In re Lyons' Estate, note 13 supra, indicated that this
result was required by the due process clause under the doctrine of Farmers Loan and
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 50 S.Ct. 98 (1930), which case has since been
overruled by State Tax Commr. of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 62 S.Ct. 1008 (1942).
In In re Rapoport's Estate, note 13 supra, the Michigan court did not even feel it necessary
to mention the constitutional question raised by a statutory overruling of the common law
rule that the situs of intangibles is at the decedent's domicile. See also Estate of Layton,
217 Cal. 451, 19 P. (2d) 793 (1933), where the California court limits the power of the
legislature to modify the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam.
111 Cities Service v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330, 72 S.Ct. 334 (1952).
16 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 71 S.Ct. 822 (1951); Hutchison
v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933); 22 CALIF. L. REv. 223 (1934).
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control over the debt by the state in which the debtor is domiciled, which control
could be manifested in garnishment or collection proceedings during the life of
the creditor,17 should not be affected merely by the death of the creditor. This
result is also consistent with the theory that the situs of intangible property may
be in different places for different purposes, 18 and recognizes that, at least where
escheat is concerned, the considerations of uniformity of administration and distribution on which the old maxim was based are not present. 19 Perhaps the only
criticism of the principal case is that the statutory policy of New York is not
de.6nitive enough to justify a court in departing from the common law maxim.20
The theory which looks to sheer power over the obligor must be administered
with discretion and self-restraint if interstate conflicts of a sort not present in the
principal case are to be avoided.
John F. Dodge, Jr., S.Ed.

17 Beale, "The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem, to Compel Payment of a Debt," 27
HAnv. L. REv. 107 (1913).
18 Smith v. Ajax Pipe Line Co., (8th Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d) 567; 15 C.J.S., Conflict
of Laws 926-928 (1939).
19 See Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N.Y. 30 (1893), for a good explanation of the reasons
behind the common law maxim.
20 " ••• it [the conflicts rules] having obtained the force of law by user and acquiescence, it belongs only to the political government of the State to change it. • . ." Parsons
v. Lyman, 20 N.Y. 103 at 112 (1859).

